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Executive Registry
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16 July 1964

The Honorable William C. Foster
Director
United States Arms Control and
Disarmament Agency
Washington, D. C.

25X1A

Dear Bill:

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This text considerably re-phrased by Mr. MacCone from version made more ample & stronger - HC

By memorandum of July 9th you requested comments on the draft statement on the verification of a freeze on strategic nuclear vehicles.

This plan as I understand it is to freeze armaments and to develop inspection procedures to verify compliance with the freeze without either a declaration or inspection of existing inventories of armaments or of the number and deployment of existing missile launchers, strategic aircraft, etc. The details of the inspection procedures have not been worked out. However, it is obvious that the approach places heavy dependence on unilateral intelligence and I must again point out that the perishability of our intelligence assets dictates extreme caution by us with respect to the extent to which we can depend upon intelligence resources as a permanent and satisfactory facility for verification.

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Moreover, even if we retain our present intelligence capabilities and improve them over the next few years as we now envisage, a substantial number of uninhibited adversary inspections would be required. This is true because of the vast number of factories and facilities which we know to exist in the Soviet Union.

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While I will not attempt to make an estimate of the number of on-site inspections required for satisfactory verification, it appears obvious from our knowledge of the Soviet industrial complex that the number and the areas involved in adversary inspections would be very great indeed.

The paper explicitly provides that there are not to be either declarations or inspections of existing inventories of armaments or of the number and deployment of existing launchers. The paper does provide for the inspections of suspicious activities, which might involve unauthorized launcher construction and improvement activities. These provisions raise the question of the adversary inspections of illegal deployment, developments and improvements, or other forbidden activities if carried on at existing sites. This appears to me as a possibility if the Soviets reached the point where they desired to improve or expand their capabilities in violation of the treaty. To protect against this the following sentence should be inserted after the first full sentence on page 12:

"This would not, however, preclude the inspection of existing launchers or launch sites for possible unauthorized launcher construction and improvement activities as provided for in the following paragraph."

Such a provision, and parallel provisions in the proposed draft agreement, would protect the parties of the treaty against the contingency mentioned and seems an essential safeguard to me although it would, to the extent exercised, provide for the inspection of existing launchers which is contrary to the basic approach of the proposed plan.

In addition to what I consider to be these very basic problems, I have the following suggestions to make:

1. The first paragraph on page seven should be replaced with the following: "To the extent that launcher replacement is permitted, appropriate declarations relating to such replacement would be required." The reason is that the nature of the controls over launchers has not yet been determined. Conceivably, substantial launcher replacement might be permitted for reasons of broad policy, e. g., to protect the MLF. Therefore, any statement about launcher replacement should be in the most general terms.

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2. The word ⁴²⁵~~"declared"~~ should be substituted for the word "those" in the second line of the second paragraph on page eight, since this is what is intended.

3. The words "...once a determination has been made that they were appropriate" should be deleted from the last sentence of the first full paragraph on page 12. These words are unnecessary and possibly misleading, because the appropriateness of an inspection is to be determined by the adversary, subject only to the security of sensitive installations.

Sincerely,

(Signed) JOHN A. McCONE

John A. McCone
Director

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 - 1st draft

JAM/mfb 15 July

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